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Introduction 
Since the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was founded in 1962, it 
has provided more than $297 billion in Assistance Grants to developing countries around the 
world (USAID 2003). Nearly 100 developing countries currently receive, or have received, some 
form of assistance from USAID, which is the main distributor of foreign assistance from the 
United States. The distribution of foreign assistance is not uniform, however, with some 
countries receiving much more than others.  Aid also varies by the type of monetary support, 
including environmental, food, agricultural, humanitarian, and political aid. The Center for 
Democracy and Governance (CDG) is responsible for allocating USAID funds specifically for 
the purpose of promoting democracy worldwide. The aim of this study is to determine how 
USAID decides which countries receive democracy assistance, and which ones do not. I examine 
competing explanations for how democracy aid distribution is determined. 
A key goal of foreign assistance research is determining what factors make the U.S. 
government more or less interested in a developing country. On the one hand, the CDG 
conceptual framework states that “promoting democracy serves vital U.S. national interests, and 
expanding the global community of democracies is a key objective of U.S. foreign policy” 
(USAID 1998). Therefore, we would expect that countries lacking in democracy will receive 
USAID democracy and governance funds. However, past research has found that the United 
States does not always provide assistance simply on the basis of need , or even where it can best 
be used to achieve an objective (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Carleton 
and Stohl 1985, 1986, 1987; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Clark 1992; Griffin and Enos 
1970; Schoultz 1981). Instead, aid is often distributed based on donor ‘realist’ interests. Realist 
interests are defined as U.S.-recipient relationships that serve to benefit the United States. A 
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benefit need not be immediately recognizable as such; instead, the United States often acts 
favorably toward foreign countries in return for future alliances and resources. While the most 
obvious relationship is an economic-based one, the United States also aids countries for political 
and security purposes. As Griffin and Enos (1970: 314) state, “Individuals may be humane and 
disinterested, but nations are not”.  
Previous research tests need versus interest primarily on economic aid, but has not 
examined how aid specifically designed to strengthen democracy is given to recipients. We do 
not know if the same factors (needs or interests) apply to democracy funding as other types of 
economic assistance. In fact, the traditional need vs. interest framework seems less appropriate 
for explaining democracy assistance than economic assistance. While we can more clearly 
identify countries and people in need of economic factors like poverty alleviation, food security, 
and sustainable water supplies, it is more difficult to claim that any country needs more 
democracy. Though most of the world’s citizens agree that democracy is the most desirable form 
of government (Inglehart and Norris 2003), there is little to no consensus on what form 
democracy should take across countries, or how democratic goals should be attained. Therefore I 
propose a new framework for thinking about democracy aid distribution based on theories of 
philanthropy.   
Philanthropists donate to non-profit organizations that they believe can provide a public 
good. These public goods are wide-ranging, from things like operas to soup kitchens. 
Traditionally the non-profit arena, including philanthropy, is thought of as separate from 
government. Governments provide some public goods through the use of tax dollars, and non-
profits provide other public goods that the government does not, cannot, or will not. However, 
this is a false dichotomy- government agencies and non-profit organizations are linked through 
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funding, board members and project goals. This appears especially clear when we look outside 
national boundaries. Governments and individual citizens alike are engaged in what can be 
thought of as international philanthropy in an increasingly international society.  
Figure 1 displays the amount of money spent by the Democracy and Governance arm of 
USAID on democracy promotion from 1990-2004. Figure 2 displays the number of countries 
receiving at least some of this money annually for the same time period.  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
If we consider the world as one interconnected society it makes more sense why the United 
States government would spend so much money in so many countries promoting an abstract 
ideal like democracy. Research has consistently shown that having more stable democratic 
governments in the world is extremely desirable. Democracies typically do not go to war with 
one another (Mousseau 1998; Russett 1993), which is important because war and conflict cripple 
economies and stunt development. Also, in democracies the social capital of citizens is greater 
(Paxton 2002). Because national and international security relies on democracies, it is important 
that we understand which countries are receiving democracy aid, and on what grounds.  
 In this paper I build two conceptual models to test how aid is distributed: a ‘strategic  
model and a ‘strategic philanthropic’ model. Realist interests are measured as economic, 
political, and security interests that might make a country more attractive for foreign aid 
distribution, but do not necessarily achieve the objective of increasing global democracy. The 
philanthropic model takes the domestic political characteristics of the potential recipients and 
examines how well their existing levels of democracy, human rights protection, and civil society 
capacity influence their receipt of aid.  
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Theoretical Background 
Do Aid Distribution Patterns Really Matter? 
Foreign aid critics often argue that the distribution patterns of aid are irrelevant, because so many 
confounding factors come between aid distribution and outcomes. In the worst cases, aid 
distribution may even have perverse impacts on societies. The first problem of uneven or 
improper distribution has been especially apparent in the arena of food aid. Many studies have 
demonstrated food aid does not go to where it is needed, has no real impact on malnutrition or 
famine, and is a derivative of rich-country surplus, not poor country need. The United States has 
been especially criticized for its uneven flows of food aid and the amount of money it spends on 
buying surplus food from U.S. growers instead of supporting local economies by spending food 
aid dollars in or around the areas affected by malnutrition. The latter problem, of aid perversion, 
continues to be purported especially in countries like Egypt, which receives a significant portion 
of USAID economic assistance each year, but has made no real strides toward democracy or 
reducing extreme stratification within its population. So why does it matter to uncover how 
democracy and governance aid is distributed? 
 The answer is: because democracy and governance aid is having real (if modest) effects 
on democratic improvements in recipient countries. A rigorous study by Finkel et al. (2007) 
found that while total aid receipt has no discernible effect on improving democracy, targeted 
Democracy and Governance Aid does lead to improvements in democracy1. They find that “an 
investment of one million dollars…would foster an increase in democracy 65 percent greater 
than the change expected for the average country in the sample in any given year” (436). In their 
analyses they control for factors that might cause the United States to give aid to a country for 
other reasons than democracy promotion, and strengthen their findings that democracy aid 
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works. Therefore, we know that there is some entrée for social science research on how 
democracy and governance aid is distributed. This is especially true if one considers that aid 
dollars invested in the ‘wrong’ kind of places could have been spent where they would make 
more of a difference. They call in the end for more work to be done on patterns of investment 
over time and across countries. It is my goal in this paper to make an effort at uncovering 
funding patterns of Democracy and Governance aid, particularly in relation to presidential 
ideology.  
Foreign Aid Funding Decisions: Based on National Realist Interests or Moral Objectives? 
The United States spends billions of dollars every year on foreign aid, which has at least some 
impact on recipient countries. In general, the research on foreign aid decisions has focused on 
testing a set of ‘national/realist interests’ and ‘recipient needs’ (Lebovic 1988; Alesina and 
Dollar 2000; Lewis 2003; McKinlay and Little 1979; Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998). Much of 
the work has tested the relationship between human rights practices and U.S. foreign aid 
(Carleton and Stohl 1987; Regan 1995; McCormick and Mitchell 2001; Apodaca and Stohl 
1999; Cingranelli and Pasquerello 1985), while other scholars have examined the impact of 
recipient country democracy on U.S. funding (Valverde 1999; Kosack 2002; Diamond 1992).  
In one of the earliest large-sample studies on foreign aid allocation, McKinlay and Little 
(1972) define the hypothesis based on the recipient need model as, “the amount of assistance 
provided to each low-income country is proportional to its economic and welfare needs” (239), 
while the hypothesis for the donor interest model is that “the amount of aid received by any low-
income country is proportional to its level of interest to the donor” (240). These hypotheses are 
fairly vague, and left open to the interpretation of the researcher. As discussed above, recipient 
need for economic assistance may be different from recipient ‘need’ for democracy or military 
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assistance. Most researchers agree, though, that low economic development is one of the key 
determinants of need. Aside from that, need has been measured by basic human welfare levels, 
such as few doctors and little food (e.g. McKinlay and Little 1972; Hess 1989), low levels of 
democracy (Alesina and Dollar 2000) and of civil liberties and human rights (e.g. Cingranelli 
and Pasquerello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; Alesina and Dollar 2000). 
In contrast to aid distributed on need or for philanthropic goals, many scholars and 
policy-analysts believe that the United States (and other donor countries, see Breuning 1995 for a 
treatment of Europe) allocate aid to countries in which it has a significant foreign policy interest. 
Most international realist scholars take the view of Morgenthau (1962),  
“It is in fact pointless even to raise the question whether the United States ought 
to have a policy of foreign aid- as much so as to ask whether the United States 
ought to have a foreign political or military policy. For the United States has 
interests abroad which cannot be secured by military means and for the support of 
which the traditional methods of diplomacy are only in part appropriate. If foreign 
aid is not available they will not be supported at all.” (301) 
 
Definitions of donor interests are varied across studies. McKinlay and Little (1972) identify five 
types of donor interest: economic, security, power political, development and political 
stability/democracy. Other studies (e.g. Lewis 2003) collapse the five categories into three: 
political, economic and security. However, these measures were largely defined during the Cold 
War, when U.S. interests were defined as opposite to Soviet interests. The time period of this 
study, 1990-2004, is after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is a time defined by rapid 
globalization, when the interests of the United States were mirrored in much of the Western 
world. Instead of differentiating between the three types of interests, I test a set of theoretical 
variables that I define simply as ‘strategic interests’. 
 The studies of interest have findings as varied as the measures. Lebovic’s (1988) 
analysis of foreign aid distribution during the Carter and Reagan administrations shows that 
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political/military interests were most central in determining which countries received aid, 
followed by economic interest. He finds that recipient needs played a smaller secondary role. 
McKinlay and Little (1972) find support only for the donor interest model, and none for the 
recipient need model2.  
These findings reflect aid allocation during the Cold War era. Several studies have 
attempted to uncover the criteria for aid allocation after the Cold War as well. Meernik, Krueger 
and Poe (1998) compare the determinants of assistance during and after the Cold War. They test 
the notion that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States no longer needs to be as 
concerned with security interests and that it can base aid decisions more on ideological criteria 
(human rights, welfare needs) than it could before. They find limited support for this hypothesis, 
but conclude that strategic donor interests remain strong predictors of receipt of aid even though 
recipient needs have more of a significant impact after the Cold War. Likewise, Lewis (2003) 
finds that during the 1989-1996 period, environmental assistance distribution was based more on 
donor interests than environmental need, although USAID was more likely to take need into 
account than the multi-lateral environmental foundation in her study. Finally, Alesina and 
Dollar’s (2000) study, which encompasses years during and after the Cold War shows that 
interest factors such as UN voting patterns by recipients and colonial history are as important for 
explaining aid distribution as are country characteristics such as democracy and need.  
There is little agreement across studies as to how aid distribution is determined. No 
scholar argues that donor interests do not play a role, although some argue that recipient needs 
                                                 
2
 Another debate arises when human rights practices are taken into consideration. In a seminal analysis, Cingranelli 
and Pasquerello (1985) determine that the U.S. Congress takes human rights practices into account when making aid 
allocations. However, in a reanalysis of their work Carleton and Stohl (1987) point out design flaws in Cingranelli 
and Paquerello’s model that result in an overemphasis on human rights. In contrast, Carleton and Stohl find no 
relationship between human rights and aid decisions.  
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are not a determining factor in allocations. My analysis adds a unique contribution in that the 
foreign assistance being studied is designed specifically to strengthen democratic practices in 
recipient countries. These data have not been available until recently, and they need to be 
examined to compare and contrast with the findings based on primarily economic or military 
assistance. In particular, democracy assistance needs to be examined because of the recent 
emphasis on building ‘preventative democracies’. As President Clinton said during his Second 
Inaugural Address (1996):  
“The world is no longer divided into two hostile camps. Instead, now we 
are building bonds with nations that once were our adversaries. Growing 
connections of commerce and culture give us a chance to lift the fortunes 
and spirits of people the world over. And for the very first time in all of 
history, more people on this planet live under democracy than 
dictatorship.” 
This statement was made during the time period under study here, when the developed world 
was occupied with creating stable democracies in former Soviet states and Africa. The rhetoric 
of politicians and policy analysts clearly shows a democratic bias when statements are made 
concerning international relations.  
The U.S. Government as Global Philanthropist 
As previously stated, however, not all countries receive assistance in democracy building, even if 
they would potentially use it. Considering USAID as akin to other international philanthropists 
opens up new ways for considering how democracy and governance promotion aid is distributed. 
Philanthropists are loosely defined here as those individuals, foundations and organizations that 
provide funds to promote a public good, without expecting a direct return in the form of profits 
(see Frumken 2006). This is in contrast to U.S. based multinational corporations that make 
investments in other countries with the expectation of returns in the form of profits that are then 
passed on to shareholders. In terms of democracy promotion it seems valid to consider USAID as 
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a sort of philanthropist as opposed to just a foreign policy tool of the federal government. The 
strategic returns for democracy aid are less obvious than with economic aid. When USAID funds 
economic development programs it is reasonable to expect that they do so not only to help poor 
people, but also have the hope of building markets in other countries that can be opened to U.S. 
business interests. The expected returns for democracy assistance are vaguely defined as ‘a more 
peaceful world’ where individuals are ‘safer to express their own desires’. Certainly some 
research has demonstrated the palliative effects of democracy on conflict and economic crises 
(Przeworski et al. 2000). And it is true that in the past no stable democracies have gone to war 
with each other, and are much less likely to experience civil armed conflict. But for many 
countries the road to stable democracy is long, and there is no guarantee that future democracies 
will look like the liberal democracy of United States, or even the social welfare democracies in 
Europe.  
 As discussed above, one major reason for giving foreign aid in the past has been to secure 
strategic allies in case of future conflicts. This was especially true during the Cold War, when 
both the United States and the Soviet Union funded developing countries in return for their 
allegiance. But post-Cold War strategic allies in this sense are arguably far less important. Most 
conflicts, be they cold or hot, are within national borders, not across them. In fact, many 
developing country governments experienced domestic crises after the Cold War because their 
dependable sources of funding dried up. In other words, a purely realist perspective cannot 
explain why the United States continued to give foreign aid in general, or democracy aid 
specifically, to countries that were unlikely be strategic allies in the 1990s. 3 
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 It will be interesting to see whether the trend switches back again in the first decades of the 21st century as the Iraq 
conflict continues without an end in sight. 
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 I argue that we need to move beyond studying foreign aid as simply a transaction 
between independent, sovereign nation-states as is done from an international relations 
perspective. The world polity/world society perspective (Boli and Thomas 1997; Hughes et al. 
forthcoming) opens up a better way to consider how foreign aid distributors such as USAID 
function now. Indeed, the world society perspective may be more applicable than a realist 
perspective for explaining why the United States spends billions of dollars in foreign aid 
annually without a clearly defined set of expected returns.  The world’s people are increasingly 
making claims of individual rights and democratic ideals on their governments. In the last 2000 
wave of the World Values Survey a majority of respondents agreed with the statement that 
democracy is the best form of government.  Furthermore, research consistently shows that 
democratic societies (while imperfect) are more successful at preventing social problems such as 
recessions, famine, child mortality and human rights abuses. As the world becomes more and 
more interconnected information travels faster than it previously could, and people living in 
democratic societies are more aware of the plight of people in poor and non-democratic 
countries. In turn, global pressures for democracy have increased.  
While the United States has always had, and will continue to have, a controversial place 
in determining ‘best practices’ for how the world society is governed, the fact of the matter is 
that democracy is an important shared ideal, and is moving in the direction of a global norm. 
Furthermore, as the world’s remaining superpower4, the United States has an image to maintain 
among the global society of nations. Any actions it takes are closely monitored by both critics 
and friends. Giving foreign aid, whether effective or not, is one way that the United States 
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 The European Union is coming to rival the United States in many ways, but foreign aid is still distributed primarily 
from national governments. 
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manages its impression of a benevolent bastion of freedom and goodwill. This is not unlike 
wealthy individual philanthropists in the United States who donate money to charitable causes.  
 Philanthropists are not simply benevolent donors who hand out money to just any person, 
association or cause. They make funding decisions for a variety of reasons, some expressive (i.e. 
funding local musicians because the donor likes music) and some instrumental (i.e. funding day 
care centers so that single mothers can hold jobs). Philanthropists work to shape social policy 
when they decide which organizations to fund, and which to avoid.  
 How does the strategic philanthropy model relate to the United States government 
and USAID in particular? It is arguable that the world society of nation states mirrors the federal 
association of United States. In the world society USAID-as-philanthropist must make decisions 
about which countries to fund for Democracy and Governance aid, and which ones not to fund. 
Further, the simple decision to have an arm of USAID specifically for doling out democracy 
assistance signals a world society policy preference for democracy. Conversely, the fact that 
USAID did not support reproductive health clinics in developing countries under Reagan, 
George H.W. Bush, and the current President Bush, but did support such clinics under President 
Clinton signals the mixed emotions that Americans have about abortion politics as translated 
through the policy preferences of their elected leaders.  
Scholars of philanthropy (Anheier and Leat 2006; Frumkin 2006) make distinctions 
between the American government and private philanthropists and foundations that do work 
domestically due to the issue of representativeness. As Frumkin (2006) notes, the American 
government is constrained in public service provision based on the wishes of voters. Voters use 
their power to elect to office or remove from office officials that provide too many or too few 
public goods with their tax dollars, or the wrong set of public goods. Philanthropists are only 
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responsible to their boards of directors and the wishes of their contributors. Moving to the 
international sphere, the lines of distinction between official aid sources and philanthropists blur. 
Americans have traditionally had very little to do with how foreign aid dollars are spent. Studies 
show that Americans in general are very unclear on how much foreign aid is given, and for what 
purposes. Also, it is difficult for American voters to gauge the effectiveness or propriety of 
foreign aid. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is no over-arching world government 
that regulates the flow of international aid dollars. If we tend to think that, domestically, 
philanthropic foundations provide for the public what the government cannot or will not, how 
can we reconcile the differences between international philanthropists and official national 
government sources of aid when there is no global government that ‘could’ or ‘should’ provide 
aid? 
Strategic philanthropy occurs when donors use set criteria to make social investments that 
they expect to have measurable success in achieving the objectives they have outlined. The 
criteria vary by donor, but have ideological components (i.e. democracy as a world value) and 
instrumental components (i.e. giving aid where it will make a difference). This is part of the 
reason that traditional philanthropy dollars tend to go to well-established organizations with 
professional staffs and track records of at least marginal successes. In terms of the distribution of 
democracy assistance, some countries are better able to ‘absorb’ democracy aid, and make real 
improvements in terms of democratic capacity. These will be countries with past democratic 
improvements, a functioning civil society, and a legal framework guaranteeing basic human 
rights. As Finkel et al. (2007) describe Democracy and Governance funds go almost immediately 
to civil society agents to do things like train judges, study media fairness, promote voter turnout, 
and more. But what about countries that have not settled upon an independent judiciary, don’t 
DRAFT 
 
14 
 
have a strong media, or do not hold elections? While we could argue that countries without all of 
those things still ‘need’ democracy, they may not be attractive areas for investment of aid 
dollars. Similarly, domestic philanthropists are less likely to fund an organization that has no 
governing board, high turnover of staff and an unclear or non-existent mission or way of 
measuring success.  
 I propose to test two competing models to determine how USAID has distributed 
democracy assistance from 1990-2004. The first model I call ‘strategic realism’. It includes 
factors such as development, economic growth, foreign policy priorities, and conflict. The 
second model I have termed ‘strategic philanthropy’. It includes factors like current democracy 
status, constitutional rights, and civil society capacity. These analyses are very exploratory in 
nature; there are certainly many other factors that can explain aid distribution, or perhaps aid is 
not distributed strategically at all.  
Presidential Period and Regional Effects 
Past research shows that presidential administrative ideology has an impact on which factors 
matter for foreign assistance distribution specifically (Apodaca and Stohl 1999), and foreign 
policy direction more broadly (Trimble 1989). The above example of international reproductive 
health policy is an example of how this has played out over the last 30 years, across four 
presidents. As Kingdon (1995) concludes, “no other single actor in the political system has quite 
the capability of the president to set agendas in given policy areas for all who deal with those 
polices”. Given that the USAID administrator and deputy administrator are appointed by the 
president and not elected by a constituency, the issue of presidential ideology is highly salient for 
this study. In this analysis, I examine how the strategic realism and strategic philanthropy models 
differ across three presidents: George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. 
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According to Congressional voting literature, Conservatives have traditionally focused on 
foreign assistance to protect national security, while Moderates and Liberals are more likely to 
focus on recipient country human rights (Avery and Forsythe 1979). If this is the case, then 
USAID under the two President Bushes should be more likely to give democracy assistance to 
countries based on the strategic realism model, while USAID under President Clinton would 
focus more on philanthropic goals.  
I also test the regional differences in aid distribution. Table 1 descriptively lays out how 
aid was distributed across regions in each presidential regime. In George H.W. Bush’s regime, 
the region largest supported by Democracy and Governance aid was Europe and Eurasia, where 
96% of countries (25/26) where given democracy assistance. This is not very surprising, given 
that Democracy and Governance aid was invented primarily to aid in post-Communism 
transitions to democracy. Latin America & the Caribbean and Africa are fairly evenly split, with 
about half of those countries receiving aid and half not. The Middle East is tipped more in the 
direction of not receiving aid (15:8), while Asian and Oceanic countries received even less aid 
(24:8). Overall, 80 countries (50.63%) received some democracy aid, while 78 countries 
(49.37%) did not. 
In the first Clinton administration term, nearly all European and Eurasian countries were 
receiving some democracy aid, and more countries in every region were receiving aid than they 
had been during the first Bush administration. Asian and Oceanic countries were still less likely 
to receive aid, but in Africa the previous patterns switched: more countries were receiving aid 
(68%) than were not. Overall, 97 of the 161 eligible countries received aid, which made the 
balance of aid receipt go to 60:40 under Clinton from 50:50 under Bush5. These trends continued 
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through the second Clinton administration, with very little change in regional variation from the 
first term.  
Under George W. Bush, some interesting changes are noted in regional distribution of 
democracy aid. First, while most eligible European and Eurasian countries were receiving aid, 
the proportion doing so is smaller than when the aid was first distributed (71% compared to 
96%). Second, the trend in the Middle East flipped: 14 of the 23 Middle Eastern countries were 
receiving aid (and 9 were not) under George W. Bush compared to 8 receiving aid (and 15 not) 
under George H.W. Bush.  
Data and Methods 
All of the data for these analyses come from the Democracy Assistance Project-Phase II directed 
by Steven Finkel, Anibal Perez-Linan, Mitchell A. Seligson, and C. Neal Tate (see Finkel et al. 
2007). Eligible countries were included if they met any of the following criteria: they received 
USAID funds (of any sort) from 1990-2004, they were classified as low or middle-income, or 
they were newly independent countries created after 1990.  This gives a sample size of 158 for 
George H.W. Bush, 161 and 162 for each Clinton term respectively and 163 for George W. 
Bush7.  
Research Design 
Because the outcome variable is a dichotomous dummy variable (1= aid given, 0= aid not given), 
I use the logit model to estimate the results. Using maximum likelihood estimation, the results 
will tell the probability that ‘aid given’ will occur, and one minus that probability gives the 
probability that ‘aid not given’ will occur (Kennedy 2003). The current study refers to the first 
stage in the aid distribution process, known as the ‘gate-keeping stage’. The United States first 
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 Multiple imputation techniques of independent variables so as not to sacrifice any countries due to missing data. 
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determines which countries to assist, which is the focus of this study, then decides how much aid 
to give to those countries it does fund. 
 I run separate analyses for each presidential term: George H.W. Bush’s (1990-1992), 
Clinton’s (1993-2996, and 1997-2000), and George W. Bush’s first term (2001-2004). It is 
important to test the effects of administrative ideology on receipt of democracy assistance. 
Although USAID is technically a non-partisan organization, the United States President appoints 
its Administrator and Deputy Administrator upon taking office. Past research has shown that 
foreign assistance distribution differs in part by the ideology of the administration (e.g. Apodaca 
and Stohl 1999). 
Indicators 
Dependent Variables 
USAID distributes four overarching types of assistance: Democracy and Human Rights, 
Economic Prosperity and Security, Social and Environmental Issues, and Humanitarian 
Response. I focus here on the Democracy and Human Rights funding, and specifically on the 
foreign assistance provided to aid countries in transition to democracy. For each of the 
theoretical models tested, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure, with a ‘1’ indicating 
that democracy assistance is given, and ‘0’ indicating that no assistance is given. For example, 
the dependent variable for the first President Bush’s term is divided into ‘did receive democracy 
aid anytime between 1990 and 1992’ and ‘did not receive aid anytime between 1990 and 1992’.  
The Strategic Realism Model 
Table 1 displays the variables and operationalizations used for these analyses. To capture the 
impact of strategic realism on receipt of aid I include a number of indicators. First, I include 
measures of a countries economic development and economic growth, measured as Gross 
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Domestic Product per Capita and annual percent change in Gross Domestic Product. I average 
each of these over the years of the presidential term; for example, GDP per Capita averaged 
between 1990 and 1992 is used to predict receipt of aid under George H.W. Bush. According to a 
realist model, USAID will be more likely to invest aid in ‘safe’ economies, which tend to have 
higher levels of development and higher economic growth. The poorest countries may not have 
the governmental capacity to absorb any aid other than that for economic, food and disaster 
assistance. I also test whether the amount of aid invested in other arenas than Democracy and 
Governance predicts receipt of D&G aid. It is possible that USAID is only giving D&G aid to 
countries that it already has a stake in: either for simplicity sake because they have 
organizational ties to that country, or as a way of protecting other investments. Democracies are 
arguable less likely to abuse, divert, or squander foreign aid dollars than non-democracies, which 
might push USAID to invest in democracy with the hope of future return on their other aid 
investments.  
 I include a measure of whether or not an armed conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2006) occurred 
during the presidential regime. This is a dummy variable where a ‘one’ indicates that armed 
conflict happened at any point during the period, and ‘zero’ for lack of conflict. There are two 
competing arguments for the impact of conflict on aid receipt. First, countries in conflict may be 
deemed unwise sites of democratic investment. Armed conflict typically suggests a lowering of 
governmental capacity, and is often correlated with other social problems such as human rights 
abuses and tightening of controls on civil society and the media. On the other hand, it is often 
during and immediately after domestic conflict that a country makes strides toward democracy if 
these strides are to be made at all. Compromise is easier (although not easy by any means) in 
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democracies, so USAID may be looking to lay the groundwork for future democratization in 
conflict prone countries. 
 Finally I include two measures of U.S. foreign policy objectives. The first is an indicator 
of interest by the U.S. State Department in a country as measured by how many times the 
Secretary or Assistant Secretary of State was mentioned in relation to the country in the New 
York Times. Again, this measure can have two interpretations. First, the State Department may 
often be mentioned in relation to countries that simply are of interest to the United States, which 
would lead us to expect that a higher number of mentions increases the likelihood of receiving 
democracy and governance aid. But second, a country may be of interest to the State Department 
for very negative reasons. Countries that are deemed problematic or hostile to the United States 
may not be more likely to receive aid. I also include a measure developed by Gartzke (2006) that 
captures alignment between the United States and another country in terms of United Nations 
General Assembly voting for each presidential period (except the last period for George W. 
Bush). Realist theories would predict that countries more aligned in terms of foreign policy 
would be more likely to receive aid. 
The Strategic Philanthropy Model 
To test whether a Strategic Philanthropy model helps our understanding of why some countries 
receive democracy aid and some do not I use four measures. First, I test whether level of 
democracy itself predicts a country’s likelihood of receiving aid. I use the Freedom House 
Democracy Index, which combines the organizations separate indexes of Civil Liberties and 
Political Rights8.  This measure captures the actual experience of democracy (or lack thereof) as 
lived by constituents of national governments. It includes both procedural elements such as 
voting regulations, elections, and representativeness, and human rights measures like individual 
                                                 
8
 I also tested the Polity IV measure of democracy and found no significant differences in results. 
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rights and autonomy. I also test whether or not a democratic ‘threshold’ must be met for a 
country receive aid using the ordinal scale of ‘free’, ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’. I created three 
dummy variables, one for each category; ‘Not free’ is the excluded category. In the presented 
models I only show the threshold models, but I discuss the impact of simple level of democracy 
on aid receipt. If a strategic philanthropy model is accurate, USAID will be more likely to invest 
in countries that are making strides toward democracy, but are not yet full democracies. 
Therefore we would expect positive returns to level of democracy, and for partly free and free 
countries to be more likely to get aid than not free countries.  
 Second I include a measure of level of democracy in the region (excluding the country in 
question), again as measured by Freedom House. There are two competing ideas of how level of 
democracy in a region might work. First, a country that is in a low-level democratic region may 
be more likely to receive aid because controlling for other factors, it could then help spread 
democracy in the region. This would be a more philanthropic argument. On the other hand, 
undemocratic regions may be viewed as a whole as unwise for investing important aid dollars. 
 Third, I test a measure of Basic Freedoms, which captures the constitutional/legislative 
capacity of a country. This is an index measuring constitutionally guaranteed rights (or lack 
thereof) to Free Speech, Association, Assembly, Press and Religion. We can view this index as a 
national philanthropic organization might view a potential fundee’s mission statement. While 
constitutional provisions do not guarantee actual follow through or government practice, they 
signal at least some affinity to democratic ideals. Therefore, we would expect that countries with 
stronger constitutional provisions are more likely to receive aid. 
 Finally, I include an Index of Conditions for Civil Society which measures the on-the-
ground conditions of the articles outlined in the Basic Freedoms measure. These two items are 
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correlated, but not extremely so. Democracies depend on a flourishing civil society, in terms of 
voluntary associations, religious associations, and the right to criticize the government If a 
philanthropic model is accurate, then we would expect country’s with better civil society 
conditions to be more likely to get democracy aid. 
Regional Variables 
I include regional control variables in the last set of models for Asia and Oceania, Latin 
American and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Africa. I test regional 
differences in the likelihood of getting aid between each of these and Europe and Eurasia (the 
excluded category). USAID and the United States has a strong history of wanting regional 
stability in European and Eurasian countries, and this became especially important after the Cold 
War as this group of countries was molding individual identities. USAID viewed these countries 
as ripe for democracy, but also ripe for conflict. In the descriptive Table 1 we saw that almost all 
European and Eurasian received democracy aid, but controlling for all other factors, do regional 
differences matter significantly for the likelihood of getting democracy aid? 
Control Variables 
I control for total population and urbanization of a country. While these measures are not 
predicted to have any direct relationship with USAID democracy assistance, past research has 
shown that countries with large, concentrated populations receive more attention than countries 
with very small populations.   
Results 
Table 3 displays the results testing the impact of the Strategic Realism (SR) model, the Strategic 
Philanthropy (SP) model, a model competing the SR and SP models, and one that tests for 
regional variation that exists outside both the SR and SP models. The results are presented 
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according to presidential regime. Other analyses completed but not shown for the sake of clarity 
of presentation are discussed as necessary following the presentation of results. Again, the goal 
of these analyses are not to uncover  the full breadth of factors that influence a country’s receipt 
of Democracy and Governance aid, but to compare these two ways of thinking about aid 
distribution on a limited set of factors that are widely available cross-nationally.  
President George H.W. Bush 
During these first tentative years of Democracy and Governance targeted aid, it is difficult to 
discern which factors are most important for a country’s likelihood of aid receipt. Looking at the 
Strategic Realism model, we see that in fact a country’s development level and annual economic 
growth negatively predict receipt of democracy aid. Therefore, under the first Bush 
administration democracy and governance aid was not in fact being targeted at countries with 
higher levels of development that might have been deemed ‘safe’ for democratic advancement, 
as older modernization-democratization hypotheses suggest. Also, a country in conflict was more 
likely to receive aid than a country not in conflict. This suggests that USAID under the Bush 
administration was targeting aid at countries ripe for transition, instead of simply promoting 
democracy in already peaceful places. 
 The strategic philanthropy model does not produce any significant results. Combining the 
strategic realism and strategic philanthropy model, we see that the significant negative effects of 
development and the significant positive effects of conflict are strengthened, but no strategic 
philanthropy model reaches significance. Finally, controlling for region we see the strongest 
predictors of aid. Europe and Eurasia is the excluded regional category, and countries in every 
other region are significantly much less likely to receive democracy aid. However, once we 
control for region we find an interesting effect of strategic philanthropy: countries that have 
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stronger outlined constitutional rights are more likely to receive aid than those with weaker or 
nonexistent basic freedoms. The negative effect of development on aid and the positive effect of 
conflict are further strengthened, but the impact of economic growth drops to insignificance. 
President William J. Clinton’s Terms 
Turning next to the distribution of aid during President Clinton’s first term of office, we see in 
the strategic realism that higher development again has a strong negative effect on receipt of aid 
(although economic growth does not have a discernible impact). Also, we find an effect of other 
aid receipt on democracy aid: the higher the amount of other USAID aid, the more likely a 
country is to get democracy assistance. This can be seen through the light of protecting other 
investments; in democracies other social ills like poverty, malnutrition, poor health, and conflict 
can be alleviated more easily. On the other hand, USAID may simply be investing democracy 
aid in countries in which it already has infrastructure for other aid programs. Presence of armed 
conflict again has a positive impact on receipt of aid, while the indicator of State Department 
interest has a negative effect. So controlling for other strategic realism factors, USAID under 
Clinton supports conflict-torn countries, but not countries that are discussed more often in the 
news. This lends credence to the idea that the countries most often discussed are ‘problems’ for 
the United States, not potential allies. Finally, we see an impact of presidential policy alignment 
as measured by UN voting: the more aligned a potential recipient is with the United States, the 
more likely it is to receive aid.  
 Looking next at the Strategic Philanthropy model, we find two significant effects that 
were not there under President Bush. The Basic Freedoms index has a strong positive effect on 
receipt of aid, as does the Civil Society index. USAID under the first Clinton administration 
invested aid in countries that had at least a basic infrastructure ready to receive the aid. 
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Combining the realism and philanthropy models, only three indicators remain significant: 
development level has a negative effect on receipt of aid, while experiencing conflict and having 
more basic constitutional freedoms positively predict aid receipt. Finally, adding in the regional 
variables it is again apparent that regional considerations are very important to USAID. Every 
region except the Middle East & North Africa is less likely to get democracy assistance than 
Europe and Eurasia. The only variables that remain significant from previous models are the 
negative impact of development and the positive impact of conflict. 
 Moving to the second Clinton administration term, the only strategic realism variables to 
have an impact are the negative effect of development, and the positive effect of other forms of 
aid investment. The impact of conflict that had been present in both the previous Clinton term 
and the previous Bush term is gone. This is potentially because armed conflicts were somewhat 
less common in the latter half of the 1990s. In the strategic philanthropy model, the only variable 
to reach significance is the Basic Freedoms Index, which has a positive impact on receipt of aid. 
Combining the two models in the SR/SP model, the effects of development and basic freedoms 
remain, but the impact of other aid receipt drops out. Finally, adding in the regional variables 
again confirms that countries in all other regions are less likely to receive aid than Europe and 
Eurasia. After controlling for region, the impact of basic freedoms falls below significance, but 
the negative impact of development and the positive impact of other aid investment remains. 
President George W. Bush 
Finally turning to the first term of the second President Bush administration, we see effects that 
essentially mirror those of the first Clinton administration. Of the strategic realism indicators, 
development continues to have a strong negative effect on receipt of aid. Countries that are more 
heavily invested in with other sorts of aid are more likely to receive democracy assistance, as are 
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those countries experiencing an armed conflict. Countries that are discussed more often in 
relation to the State Department are less likely to get aid. Turning to the Strategic Philanthropy 
model, we find that countries with stronger constitutional basic freedoms are more likely to get 
aid. This impact remains when the realist and philanthropic models are combined, as do the 
negative impacts of development and State Department priorities, and the positive impact of 
other aid investment. Finally, adding in the regional variables, we see that strong regional biases 
remain. European and Eurasian countries are more likely to receive aid than any other countries. 
Controlling for region eliminates the impact of basic freedoms on aid receipt, but the previous 
strategic realism impacts remain: more developed countries are less likely to get aid, countries of 
greater concern to the State Department are less likely to get aid, and countries that are more 
heavily invested in by other arenas of USAID are more likely to get aid.  
Discussion 
In this study, I find support for both the strategic realism and strategic philanthropy models. This 
opens the door for future theory and research on democracy assistance based on the new way of 
thinking of USAID as one of many global philanthropists in an increasingly connected world 
polity. However, the time period under question matters for which factors determine whether or 
not a country receives democracy assistance.  
The first major finding to discuss is actually a weak or non-existent finding. In the 
models presented in Table 3, it is notable that the impact of country level current democracy has 
no discernable impact on the likelihood of receiving aid. However, in models not shown here, I 
tested the impact of democracy by itself on receipt of aid. Without controlling for strategic realist 
or other strategic philanthropist indicators, I find that Partly Free countries are indeed more 
likely to receive democracy assistance than Not Free countries during all four presidential terms. 
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Level of democracy did not have an independent impact when it was modeled alone to predict 
receipt of aid. However, in each of Clinton’s terms, after controlling for strategic philanthropic 
variables level of democracy actually had a significant negative effect on receipt of democracy 
assistance. This lends further credence to the idea of strategic philanthropy: it is not that USAID 
is simply looking for more democratic countries and giving them aid. Instead, it is giving aid to 
those countries with the basic infrastructure in terms of constitutional freedoms and civil society 
that still have room for democratic improvements. It is in fact interesting that while Partly Free 
countries were more likely to get aid than Not Free countries, Free Countries were not more 
likely to get aid than Not Free countries.  
A second major finding is that the impact of presidential ideology did not have much of 
an effect on which factors predicted receipt of democracy assistance. Under both the Clinton 
administrations and the second Bush administration the strategic realism factor of other aid 
investment increased the likelihood of a country getting aid. In all administrations the presence 
of conflict also increased the likelihood of receiving democracy assistance. As far as the strategic 
philanthropy model goes, the first Bush administration has weak results. Only after controlling 
for everything else does a positive impact of the Basic Freedoms Index appear. But in the 
Clinton and second Bush administrations’, the impact of Basic Freedoms on receipt of aid is 
fairly consistent. However, only in the first Clinton administration does the impact of conditions 
for civil society appear significant. This may be due in part to the fact that so much of 
Democracy and Governance aid is designed to strengthen civil society. It is plausible that when 
USAID is determining which countries they should invest precious Democracy and Governance 
dollars; they do not view a weak civil society as a negative. Instead, they find those countries 
that have made at least a verbal and constitutional commitment to civil society, and then work on 
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improving the reality of civil society. Given the weakness of presidential regime differences, it 
appears that the Democracy and Governance arm of USAID is acting rather autonomously, in 
contrast to previous research that concludes USAID is just a foreign policy tool of whatever 
president is sitting in the Oval Office. 
The third major finding is that regional considerations remain very important through 
every time period. Democracy and Governance aid began being distributed immediately after the 
Cold War to foster democracy in former Communist states. As a sort of ‘new Marshall Plan’, 
USAID clearly has an interest in improving democratic capacity in those regions of the world 
that were historically important, and are culturally similar to the United States and Western 
Europe. European and Eurasian countries have a long history of nation-statehood, however much 
they were weakened by the Soviet Union and the Cold War. Many had tentative experiences with 
representative democracy in the past, and could potentially be viewed as safer investments in a 
strategic philanthropic sense than other regions. It should be reiterated, though, that countries in 
every region of the world do receive aid, and that the balance was shifting over the 1990s and 
early 2000s to more countries receiving aid than previously done so. However, there is an 
apparent leveling off in the second Bush administration, with fewer new countries getting aid 
than in the past. Future research should consider why this is, and whether the trend will again 
move toward more countries receiving aid. It is possible that September 11th and the Iraq conflict 
forced USAID to halt spreading new democracy and governance resources into previously 
unchartered territory, instead focusing on current projects.  
The fourth and final major finding is that, as mentioned above, countries experiencing 
conflict were more likely to receive aid than those not experiencing conflict in every presidential 
period. While this may run counter to intuition, it is not entirely surprising given research that 
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demonstrates that democratization can actually take off during and immediately after conflict. As 
one example, the Rwandan genocide happened in 1994 during President Clinton’s first term. 
With nearly a million killed and the country ripped to shreds, it seemed impossible that 
democracy could ever gain a foothold in a country where neighbors had massacred each other. 
Now, though, Rwanda’s still-tentative democracy is gaining traction and very positive 
development around such issues as women’s rights are appearing. Rwanda has one of the highest 
proportions of women parliamentarians, which is an important marker of democracy.  But 
Rwanda’s democracy did not rise spontaneously out of the dust. It has been aided by external 
funders and the building of civil society associations. This is what Finkel et al. (2007) call 
‘externally-funded, agent-driven’ democracy building.  
Conclusions 
In this paper, I have attempted to discover the complicated factors that determine who gets some 
of the money from the Democracy and Governance branch of USAID, and who does not. The 
analyses presented here expand on previous work in the field of foreign assistance research by 
examining newly released data specifically about democracy assistance.  
The findings do suggest that USAID democracy assistance is not given out at random, or 
for purely self-interested reasons. Instead, there are important factors considered by USAID that 
I start to uncover here. Future research should consider more closely how the timing of these 
factors affects the likelihood of getting democracy aid. Also because regions are not equal in 
terms of getting democracy assistance, within-region analyses should be conducted to determine 
why some countries within regions get democracy assistance while others do not. Future research 
should also consider how differences in conflict scale and scope impact the likelihood of getting 
aid. Are countries with low-level conflict getting aid because they are relatively ‘safe’ for 
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investment, or are countries that have experienced dramatic and widespread conflict being 
targeted for immediate reconstruction that includes democratization? 
In previous research, scholars find more support for aid distribution based on donor 
interests, and limited support for aid distributed based on need. I reframe these distinctions into 
more theoretically appropriate ones by comparing a strategic realism model to a strategic 
philanthropy model. This distinction makes more sense when considering the distribution of 
democracy aid: can we really say that a population needs democracy in the same way that a 
population needs food, healthcare and poverty alleviation? Some will say, yes, in fact we can say 
that a country needs democracy assistance. I argue that we should think of democracy as an ideal 
to be promoted, but that we should not consider it as a need. Thinking of the Democracy and 
Governance arm of USAID as a global philanthropic entity is more useful. Within the United 
States philanthropy is used to promote a myriad of activities that are certainly useful, but not 
necessary in the very basic sense of the word. Can one say that operas in the park are necessary 
for the greater good of American society in the same way that poverty alleviation efforts for 
women and children are necessary? No, but that does not mean that operas in the park do not 
contribute to the public good. It is through this lens that I argue that Democracy and Governance 
Assistance contributes to the public good of global stability and individual prosperity. The 
returns to the United States will not happen in the short-term, and are not quite as direct as 
economic investment might be, but the potential for a more democratic globe is a worthy ideal in 
which to invest. 
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Table 1. Regional Distribution of Democracy Aid
Africa Asia & Oceania
Europe & 
Eurasia
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean
Middle East 
& North 
Africa
Total
Number 25 24 1 13 15 78
% of Period 15.82 15.19 0.63 8.23 9.49 49.37
Number 21 8 25 18 8 80
% of Period 13.29 5.06 15.82 11.39 5.06 50.63
Total 46 32 26 31 23 158
Total % 29.11 20.25 16.46 19.62 14.56 100
Number 15 23 1 12 13 64
% of Period 9.32 14.29 0.62 7.45 8.07 39.75
Number 32 9 27 19 10 97
% of Period 19.88 5.59 16.77 11.8 6.21 60.25
Total 47 32 28 31 23 161
Total % 29.19 19.88 17.39 19.25 14.29 100
Number 10 20 3 13 14 60
% of Period 6.17 12.35 1.85 8.02 8.64 37.04
Number 37 13 25 18 9 102
% of Period 22.84 8.02 15.43 11.11 5.56 62.96
Total 47 33 28 31 23 162
Total % 29.01 20.37 17.28 19.14 14.20 100.00
Number 8 18 1 10 11 48
% of Period 5.00 11.25 0.63 6.25 6.88 30.00
Number 39 13 27 21 12 112
% of Period 24.38 8.13 16.88 13.13 7.50 70.00
Total 47 31 28 31 23 160
Total % 29.38 19.38 17.50 19.38 14.38 100.00
Number 14 20 8 13 9 64
% of Period 8.59 12.27 4.91 7.98 5.52 39.26
Number 33 14 20 18 14 99
% of Period 20.25 8.59 12.27 11.04 8.59 60.74
Total 47 34 28 31 23 163
Total % 28.83 20.86 17.18 19.02 14.11 100.00
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Table 2. Operationalizations 
Aid Receipt 1=Aid Received During Term, 0=Aid Not Received 
Development Gross Domestic Product Per Capita, PPP in thousands of 2000 U.S. Dollars
Economic Growth Annual Growth in GDP Per Capita, % Change in 2000 U.S. Dollars
Aid Investment Total USAID Investment in Sectors Other than Democracy and Governance, in Millions of 2000 U.S. Dollars
Armed Conflict Years in Which the Country was Involved in Armed Conflict 
Foreign Policy Priority (SD) State Department Priority as Measured by Mentions of Country in Relation to Secretary of State in New York Times
Foreign Policy Alignment (UN) Degree of Agreement Between Administration and Country in U.N. General Assembly Votes, -1=Complete Disagreement to 1=Complete Agreement
Democracy Level Freedom House Index of Liberal Democracy, Ranging from 1 to 13 (High Scores = 
More Liberal Democracy)
Free Countries Rated Free by Freedom House Index
Partly Free Countries Rated Partly by Freedom House Index
Not Free Countries Rated Not Free by Freedom House Index
Regional Democracy Average Freedom House Score for All Countries in the Region, 1=Authoritarian to 13=Democratic
Basic Freedoms Index of Constitutional Rights to Free Speech, Association, Assembly, Press, and 
Religion
Civil Society Index of Conditions for Civil Society, based on freedom of Organization, Assembly, Religion, Worker's Rights, Movement, and Women's Economic Rights
Africa Regional Variable 1=Country in Africa, 0=Not in Africa
Asia and Oceania Regional Variable 1=Country in Asia, 0=Not in Asia
Latin America & Caribbean Regional Variable 1=Country in Latin America 0=Not in Latin America
Middle East & North Africa Regional Variable 1=Country in Middle East 0=Not in Middle East
Source: Finkel et al. 2008
Variable Operationalization
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Table 3. Regression of Receipt of Aid on Strategic Realism and Strategic Philanthropy
SR SP SR/SP Regional SR SP SR/SP Regional SR SP SR/SP Regional SR SP SR/SP Regional
b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b
Variable (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Constant -0.544 -1.518 1.662 16.836 0.167 -0.405 -0.519 27.874 1.240 1.849 1.057 9.847 0.523 4.298 3.570 31.120
Development -0.160+ -0.192* -0.359** -0.293*** -0.323*** -0.412** -0.410*** -0.429*** -0.506*** -0.273*** -0.265*** -0.277***
(0.083) (0.094) (0.128) (0.082) (0.090) (0.135) (0.089) (0.098) (0.141) (0.066) (0.070) (0.082)
Economic Growth -0.095** -0.103** 0.025 -0.011 -0.016 -0.011 0.030 0.032 0.022 0.084 0.049 -0.102
(0.036) (0.038) (0.128) (0.034) (0.037) (0.076) (0.045) (0.049) (0.057) (0.067) (0.072) (0.099)
Aid Investment 0.002 0.002 0.005+ 0.004+ 0.004 0.005 0.005+ 0.005 0.007+ 0.011* 0.014* 0.010+
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Armed Conflict 0.903* 1.063* 1.259* 0.908+ 1.143* 1.284+ 0.436 0.266 0.310 1.026+ 0.643 0.669
(0.439) (0.480) (0.561) (0.504) (0.563) (0.699) (0.568) (0.641) (0.713) (0.610) (0.658) (0.724)
Policy Priority (S.D) -0.025 -0.013 -0.066 -0.075+ -0.061 -0.059 -0.031 -0.020 -0.003 -0.054+ -0.068* -0.064+
(0.019) (0.021) (0.049) (0.043) (0.055) (0.073) (0.040) (0.052) (0.074) (0.030) (0.031) (0.038)
Policy Alignment 0.796 0.668 0.563 1.686* 1.389 -0.560 0.250 0.222 -1.984
(0.852) (0.941) (1.212) (0.770) (0.852) (1.045) (0.788) (0.857) (1.231)
Democracy (FH)
Free -0.478 0.505 0.687 -0.952 0.575 0.324 -0.602 0.389 0.308 0.058 0.365 0.852
(0.644) (0.766) (0.888) (0.704) (0.853) (1.102) (0.701) (0.903) (1.055) (0.826) (0.963) (1.113)
Partly Free 0.544 0.893 0.752 0.213 0.880 0.956 0.603 0.931 0.910 0.447 0.123 0.562
(0.487) (0.586) (0.692) (0.536) (0.638) (0.781) (0.547) (0.709) (0.818) (0.643) (0.765) (0.882)
Regional Democracy 0.020 0.007 -1.365 -0.124 -0.140 -2.279 -0.066 -0.041 -0.384 -0.136 -0.098 -2.048+
(0.090) (0.103) (0.925) (0.089) (0.110) (1.687) (0.087) (0.127) (0.258) (0.090) (0.110) (1.191)
Basic Freedoms 0.195 0.328 0.619* 0.552** 0.658* 0.523 0.507* 0.570* 0.243 0.450* 0.499+ 0.221
(0.181) (0.217) (0.285) (0.214) (0.257) (0.319) (0.216) (0.289) (0.352) (0.224) (0.263) (0.288)
Civil Society 0.034 0.017 0.010 0.054+ 0.024 0.058 0.004 0.001 0.020 -0.049 -0.051 -0.077
(0.031) (0.036) (0.045) (0.032) (0.039) (0.052) (0.030) (0.038) (0.050) (0.040) (0.048) (0.057)
Africa -11.535* -16.563+ -6.122** -13.227+
(4.683) (9.389) (2.046) (6.867)
Asia & Oceania -10.439** -17.866+ -7.051*** -12.536+
(3.961) (10.097) (1.906) (7.190)
Latin America & Caribbean -3.788* -7.281* -4.884*** -4.643*
(1.688) (2.851) (1.453) (2.229)
Middle East & North Africa -9.708* -17.685 -7.236** -14.959+
(4.174) (11.343) (2.254) (8.539)
Percent Urban 0.021 -0.003 0.020 0.012 0.025* -0.013 0.029* -0.001 0.028* -0.021* 0.030* 0.010 0.022+ -0.016+ 0.023 -0.008
(0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017)
Total Population -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
George H.W. Bush Clinton First Term Clinton Second Term George W. Bush
 
